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and winner‟s profit when the range of uncertainty of the common value component is large. (5) 
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1. Introduction 
 
In  an  ascending  price  auction,  when  values  are  interdependent,  bidders  can  use  bidding 
information concerning when other bidders drop out of the auction to form an estimate of their 
own value for the object. This suggests that the prices at which others drop out might become an 
integral part of a bidder‟s decision process in such an auction. The concern for controlling bidding 
information in auctions arises from the dilemma that, on one hand, bidding information can assist 
bidders in estimating the value of the auctioned items and increase auction revenue, but, on the 
other  hand,  bidding  information  can  facilitate  and  sustain  collusive  outcomes,  especially  in 
multi-object environment. Because of these opposing effects on auction performance the problem 
of controlling bidding information is a two-edged sword (Cramton, 1998). In fact, this was exactly 
the major concern when the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) was considering whether 
to disclose bidding information.   
 
“The FCC could have hindered collusion by revealing only the bid amounts between rounds, and 
not the bidders’ identities. It chose not to do this in the broadband auction and instead gave out 
full details of each round’s bidding, because it judged that the risk of collusion was outweighed by 
benefits of the information.” 
-- McAfee and McMillian, “Analyzing the Airwaves Auction”, 1996. 
 
However,  is  information  really  beneficial  to  bidders  in  ascending  auctions?  This  is  the  major 
question to be addressed in this paper.   
 
The major support for providing bidding information in auctions comes from the theoretical result 
that  when  bidders‟  signals  concerning  the  value  of  the  object  are  affiliated,  English  auctions 
generate more revenue than sealed bid auctions (Milgrom and Weber, 1982). However, laboratory 
evidence  does  not  fully  confirm  this  result.  Levin  et  al.  (1996)  show  that  when  bidders  are   3 
inexperienced, English auctions generate less revenue than first price sealed bid auctions; winning 
bidders earn more in English auctions. English auctions generate more revenue for sellers only 
when bidders become experienced. Under a specific environment
1, Kirchkamp and Moldovanu 
(2004) show theoretically and with experiments that English auctions generate higher efficiency, 
the same revenue for the seller and higher profit for the winning bidder, when compared to second 
price sealed bid auctions.   
 
Goeree and Offerman (2003) show that, under the assumption that bidders‟ signals are independent, 
expected efficiency, revenue and winner‟s profit are the same under both English and sealed bid 
auctions in an environment with both private and common value components.
2  In other words, this 
model provides theoretical support for the proposition that bidding information is not beneficial to 
auction performance. If the proposition turns out to be supported by the experimental results, it 
provides  the  evidence  for  auction  designers  to  reevaluate  the  impression  that  “information  is 
beneficial” when the current environment is under consideration in practice. Otherwise, depending 
on the results, further research under different environments should be carried out. To understand 
the effect of bidding information in ascending auctions, we conduct experiments that examine this 
theory‟s validity. 
 
We consider an English „clock‟ auction with reentry (EWR).    At the beginning of the auction, 
price is set at a very low level. The auctioneer continuously raises the price and bidders simply 
determine whether to remain active (continue to demand) or drop out. The drop out decision is 
revocable meaning that a bidder can later choose to demand at a higher price even though he 
“dropped out” at a lower price. (In the treatment with full information the drop out and reenter 
                                                 
1  In their setting, there are three bidders, each bidder‟s value depends on his own signal plus a parameter times the 
signal of his right hand side bidder (imagine the bidders are sitting at a round table).   
2  The properties of auction models with both private and common value components have also been discussed by 
Dasgupta and Maskin (2000), Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001), Maskin (1992), Jackson (2005), Mikoucheva and Sonin 
(2004) and Pesendorfer and Swinkels (2000).   4 
decisions would be announced to all bidders.) The auctioneer awards the item to the last bidder 
who remains active in the auction. In the traditional English clock auction model, where bidders‟ 
decisions are irrevocable (Milgrom and Weber, 1982), only bidders remaining active in the auction 
can take advantage of the information revealed by previous drop out bidders. However, EWR 
allows bidders who have already dropped out to take advantage of the information revealed by 
bidders who drop out later, therefore, all bidding information can be utilized by every bidder in the 
auction. 
 
We examine bidding information as a treatment effect in the EWR
3  because a lack of testable 
empirical evidence leaves auctioneers uncertain about how much information to provide bidders. 
The experimental design, which will be  discussed in detail later, consists of one treatment where 
bidders have no knowledge about how many and which bidders remain active (no information 
case), and another treatment where bidders know the exact identity of the active bidders at each 
price  (full  information  case).  Our  results  show  that  providing  bidding  information  has  no 
significant  effect  on  expected  revenue  or  expected  efficiency.  However,  providing  bidding 
information increases the variability of revenue and winner‟s profit when the uncertainty level of 
the common value component is high. Information can have a significant effect on winners‟ profits 
depending on the level of common value uncertainty and Nash profit prediction.         
 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the economic environment and auction 
institution implemented. Section 3 provides the theoretical predictions and hypotheses to be tested. 
Section 4 discusses the experimental design and procedures. Section 5 provides the results. Section 
6 concludes.   
 
                                                 
3  Bikhchandani and Riley (1991) classify open ascending auctions with different levels of information revealed and 
possibility of reentry into six categories. They show that when bidding information is totally concealed, the strategies 
in auctions with and without reentry allowed are isomorphic for more than two bidders.   5 
 
2. The Environment and Auction Design 
 
We consider an auction which allocates a single object among n bidders. Bidders‟ values for the 
object are comprised of both common and private value components. Each bidder has a common 
value signal ci (i indexes the bidder) and a private value pi. The common value,  C, which is 











). The actual value vi of the object for each bidder is the common value plus the 
bidder‟s private value, i.e., vi = C + pi. Bidders who are not allocated the object earn zero profit 
while the bidder who is allocated the object (winner) earns vi minus the auction price. 
 
The object is auctioned-off using an ascending clock auction. A clock, which indicates the current 
price of the auctioned object, is initialized at a low price at the beginning of the auction and is 
increased  through  a  series of  fixed size  price  increments.  At each increment, bidders  indicate 
whether they are willing to buy (demand) the object at the current price. The clock rises to the next 
increment level whenever the number of demanders is greater than 1.   
 
Bidders have two options. One is to indicate that they are willing to buy and the other one is to 
indicate that they are not willing to buy at the current price.    Bidders can switch between these 
two options as long as the auction has not ended. This paper will use the terms „drop out‟ and „exit‟ 
interchangeably  to  describe  the  action  of  not  demanding  and  use  the  terms  „come  back‟  and 
„reenter‟ interchangeably to describe the action of demanding again after having exited.   
 
The auction stops when the number of demanders is less than or equal to 1. In the case where the 
number of demanders is equal to 1, the object is allocated to the remaining active bidder at the 
current  price  (i.e.  the  price  where  the  last  competing  bidder  dropped  out).  In  the  case  where   6 
demand is zero (i.e. more than one bidder dropped out at the current price), the winner will be 
randomly selected from one of the bidders who dropped out at the current price and he will pay the 
previous price.   
 
 
3. Predictions and Hypotheses 
 
For symmetric equilibria, without loss of generality, we can focus on any one bidder, say bidder 1‟s 





t   .
4  In the second price sealed bid auction, 
when bidders are uncertain about their true values, the equilibrium bidding strategy suggests that a 
bidder should submit a bid equal to his expected value of the auctioned item assuming that his type 
equals the maximum of all other bidders‟ types. If the bidder wins the auction and has to pay what 
he bids, he can infer that the highest type of all other bidders is the same as his, which is exactly 
what  he  expects  when  forming  his  bidding  strategy  (see  (Krishna,  2002),  p.88).  Let 





y    denote the highest type of the  n-1 other bidders. Then bidder 1‟s risk 
neutral strategy is to bid: 
 
            B(x)=E(C+p1|t1=x, y1=x),                                                (1) 
 
where E is the expected value operator.    If each risk neutral bidder follows the strategy defined in 
(1), this will be a Nash equilibrium of the second-price auction.
5 
                                                 
4  Type t1 is a variable that summarizes the private value signal and common value signal for bidder 1. Goeree and 














. Since bidder 1's private information is c1 and p1, the first order condition for profit 





t     . 
5  Derivation can be found in Goeree and Offerman (2003).   7 
 
For  the  ascending  clock  auction  with  reentry  and  with  no  bidding  information,  the  Nash 
equilibrium bid function will be the same as that in (1).    The intuition is simple.    Suppose all 
other bidders follow the equilibrium bidding strategy in (1).    During the auction and before the 
price reaches B, bidder 1 is unable to infer the types of any other bidders because he does not know 
at what prices they dropped out of the auction. If he tries to infer the type of others by temporarily 
dropping out before reaching B, there are two possibilities. Either the auction stops immediately, or 
the clock price will continue to rise. If it stops, bidder 1 may have lost to someone with a lower 
type than himself and forgone some profit because he dropped out before B.    If it rises, he has 
learned nothing.    If bidder 1 drops out at B and sees that the price is still moving up, he can infer 
that there are at least two bidders with types higher than himself. Since winning the auction with 
the type that is not the highest is not expected to be profitable
6, bidder 1 should not reenter the 
auction. By the same token, bidder 1 should not drop out later than B.   
 
Thus, without bidding information, the ascending clock auction and the second price auction are 
isomorphic
7.      
 
In the ascending clock auction, when bidders are uncertain about their true values, the equilibrium 
bidding  strategy  is  recursively  defined.  When  no  bidder  has  dropped -out,  a  bidder  keeps 
demanding the item until the price reaches his expected value assuming that his type equals all 
other n-1 bidders‟ types. This is to assure that if all bidders drop out at the same price, the bidder 
who  is  allocated  the item  pays  the  price  equal  to  what  he  expects  when  forming  his  bidding 
strategy. After the first bidder drops out, other bidders infer his type from his drop out price and 
reformulate their expected value of the item using this new piece of information and assuming that 
                                                 
6  The expected profit of winner is t1-t2, where t1 is the highest type and t2 is the second highest type. 
7  Bikhchandani and Riley (1991) prove the same result in their common value model. Similar to us, they use the mean 
of all bidders‟ common value signals as the value for all bidders. The differences are that they do not consider a private 
value component and the bidders‟ signals are strictly affiliated.     8 
their types equal all other n-2 bidders‟ types. This strategy is recursively defined for the remaining 
n-1 bidders (see (Krishna, 2002), p.91).   
 
Thus, the symmetric Nash equilibrium bidding strategy for the ascending clock auction with bid 
information is given by: 
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where ) ,..., ; ( 1 k k b b x B is the highest price bidder 1 is willing to pay in the auction given his type t1=x 
and that k bidders have dropped out at the prices b1,…,bk.
8   
 
When  bidding  information  is  provided  in  the  ascending  clock  auction  with  reentry,  nothing 
changes.    Whenever a bidder exits (not demanding the object at the current price), other bidders 
infer his type from his exiting price. Whenever the bidder reenters into the auction, other bidders 
can change their inference of the reentering bidder‟s type as if he has never exited before. Using 
equation (2), bidders change their bidding strategy of Bk(x;b1,…bk) to Bk-1(x;b1,…,bi-1,bi+1,…bk). 
Therefore, bidders have no way to affect other bidders‟ valuations by exiting then reentering the 
auction.
9   
 
When considering whether a bidder would deviate from the equilibrium strategy, it is essential to 
consider whether it would be profitable to do so. Under the current auction setting, bidders cannot 
benefit from exiting without reentry because the profit of not winning is 0. Since exiting with 
reentry does not affect the valuations of other bidders, exiting earlier is not profitable. How about 
                                                 
8  Derivation can be found in Goeree and Offerman (2003). 
9  Izmalkov (2003) shows that bidders are unable to earn additional profit by temporary exit in a revocable exit 
auction.   9 
exiting later? A bidder can potentially earn a positive profit only by delaying his exit until he 
becomes the winner of the auction. Note that each Bk is strictly increasing in x. This implies that 
winner has the highest type. Suppose t2 is the highest type. Bidder 1, who has t1, delays his exit and 
becomes the winner. Suppose all bidders except bidder 1 follow the bidding strategy in equation 
(2). Upon winning, bidder 1‟s expected profit is  

     
1
1 2 2 1 1 ) ( ) | ( / 1
n
i n i t B t t c E n t   where Bn-2(t2) 
can be written as 
) | ( ) | ( ) / 2 ( ) | ( ) / 1 ( 2 2
1
2 1 t t p E t t c E n t t c E n
n
i i      

  . Therefore, bidder 1‟s expected profit is 
2 1 2 2 2 1 ) | ( ) | ( ) / 2 ( ) | ( ) / 1 ( t t t t p E t t c E n t t c E n t         . Since t2 is the highest type, bidder 
1‟s expected profit is negative.         
 
Suppose bidder 1 bids according to equation (2) and determines to exit at price level B. If bidder 1 
drops out at B and sees that the price is still moving up, the equilibrium bidding strategy suggests 
that he should not reenter the auction because the outcome implies that he is not holding the 
highest type. In this equilibrium, the expected profit from winning, if a bidder does not have the 
highest type, is negative.
10 
 
Therefore, the strategy in the ascending clock auction with bidding information is the same as the 
strategy in the English auction. 
 
Goeree and Offerman (20 03) prove that the expected efficiency,   winner‟s  profit  and  seller‟s 
revenue  are  the  same  under  second  price  sealed  bid  auction  and  English  auction  in  the 
common/private value environment we have posed. We demonstrated the intuition that, although 
provided with the reentry option, bidders should not utilize the reentry feature. When bidding 
information is provided, the equilibrium bidding strategy follows the one in English auction and 
                                                 
10  Harstad and Rothkopf (2000) use similar argument for the equivalence of equilibrium bidding strategy under 
“Alternating Recognition” English auction model with and without reentry.   10 
when bidding information is not provided, the equilibrium bidding strategy follows the one in 
second  price  sealed  bid  auction.  Putting  these  conditions  together  we  form  the  following 
hypotheses: 
 
H1: RevenueNoInfo = RevenueInfo = RevenueNash   
H2: Winner‟s profitNoInfo = Winner‟s profitInfo = Winner‟s profitNash   
H3: EfficiencyNoInfo = EfficiencyInfo = EfficiencyNash 
H4: Number of ReentriesNoInfo = Number of ReentriesInfo = 0 
 
Testing the first three hypotheses answers questions concerning whether bidding information is 
beneficial in ascending auctions and whether theory well predicts those outcomes. Testing the last 
hypothesis allows us to understand whether the bidders‟ behavior closely follows the theoretical 
prediction that reentry has no strategic value.   
 
When a bidder fails to incorporate the negative information that others dropping out implies, he 
could fall prey into the winner‟s curse which cannot be accounted for in the equilibrium bidding 
strategy because the latter assumes fully rational behavior. Previous laboratory results suggest that 
bidders fall prey to the winner‟s curse more seriously when bidding information is not provided: 
we will see whether this phenomenon continues in our environment.     
 
4. Experimental Design 
 
The motivation for this research is to study the effect of disclosing bidding information in an 
auction environment where bidders are uncertain about the value of the auctioned object. Based on 
the auction format discussed in section 2, two treatments regarding information are conducted. In 
one information treatment, bidders are only informed about the current clock price of the object   11 
being auctioned (No bid Information is provided (NI)). In other words, bidders only know whether 
there is excess demand or not at the previous price level.    In the second information treatment 
bidders are provided with the identity of bidders who demanded the object at each clock price (Full 
bidder Information (FI)). These two information treatments are tested against two levels of the 
common value signal range, creating less or more uncertainty in the common value portion of the 
item‟s value. In one treatment, the common value signals are uniformly distributed between 475 
and 525, that is ci ~U[475,525] (small range (SR)). In the other treatment, the common value 
signals are uniformly distributed between 425 and 575, that is ci ~U[425,575] (large range (LR)). 
Since the Nash predicted earnings are different under different common value signal ranges, the 
exchange rates were chosen
11  such that the expected earnings in US dollars were the same under 
the different ranges. The treatments are summarized in table 1.   
    
Each session used 4 subjects (n=4) who participated in a sequence of 20 auctions. The same set of 
private value signals were used for the n
th auction in all sessions. Private values were uniformly 
distributed from 475 to 525, i.e., pi ~U[475, 525], which is the same as the distribution of common 
value signals in the SR treatment.   
 
[Table 1 here] 
 
The common value signals in SR and LR were correlated through a mean preserving algorithm. 
For each auction in the SR sessions, a set of common value signals was drawn. Let csr represent a 
common value signal in the small range and let clr represent the corresponding common value 
signal  in  the  large  range.  csr  is  transformed  to  clr  using  this  formula 
clr=(csr-500)x((575-425)/(525-475))+500. This is to ensure that the difference between each signal 
                                                 
11  The currencies used in the experiment are e-dollars. In the SR treatment, e-dollars are converted to US dollar at the 
rate of 2 e-dollars=1 US dollar. In the LR treatment, e-dollars are converted to US dollar at the rate of 3 e-dollars=1 
US dollar.   12 
and the means of SR and LR relative to their ranges are identical and prevent inconsistent results 
due to different random draws in different ranges.   
 
All private and common value signals were rounded to the nearest integer. The sets of common 
value signals under SR/NI and SR/FI are the same and the set of common value signals under 
LR/NI and LR/FI are the same.   
   
Subjects  were recruited from the student  population of George  Mason University.  When  each 
session  was  ready  to  begin,  each  subject  was  assigned  a  seat  at  a  visually  isolated  computer 
terminal from which they made their decisions during the session. Each subject was given a set of 
instructions and scratch paper. Instructions were read aloud by the session monitor
12. After reading 
the instructions, subjects participated  as bidders in two trial  auctions (no earnings). This was to 
familiarize them with the auction software.   
 
At the beginning of each session, subjects were endowed with  either 50 (in SR) or 75 (in LR) 
e-dollars as their initial bank balance. Each subject‟s earnings from each subsequent auction (either 
positive or negative) were added to or subtracted from his bank balance. If any subject‟s bank 
balance reached zero (bankruptcy), the monitor ended the session. The subject who went bankrupt 
was paid the $7 USD show-up fee. Each subject who did not go bankrupt was paid the $7 USD 
show-up fee plus the cash equivalent of his bank balance.   
 
In each auction, each subject was randomly allocated a bidder ID (1, 2, 3 or 4) to reduce any 
repeated game effects. At the beginning of each auction, bidders were privately told their private 
and common value signals. Then, the clock started to rise at a rate of 1 e-dollar per second. Bidders 
were provided the identities of all bidders demanding at each price under the FI treatment. Bidders 
                                                 
12  The instructions for the SR/FI treatment is in the Appendix.   13 
made their decisions using two buttons. One button indicated their willingness to buy at the current 
price and the other indicated their willingness not to buy at the current price. (A screen shot of the 
bidders‟ computer interface is provided in Appendix)
13. The bidders were assumed to carry over 
their decisions from one price level to the next. At the end of each auction, bidders were told the 
common  value  of  the  object,  and  to  whom  it  was  allocated  at  the  final  price.  Bidders  were 
informed of only their own profit earned in each auction and not the profits of others. There were 
20 auctions held in each session but bidders were not informed of this until the final auction ended.   
 
Every auction each bidder was given a piece of information called the “Will Lose Point” that 
showed the bidder his highest possible value for the auction object. It was simply calculated as a 
function of each bidder‟s own private information and the assumption that all other bidders had 
received  the  highest  possible  common  value  signal  (525  for  SR  treatments  and  575  for  LR 
treatments). If the bidder bought at a price beyond this point, he would make a loss for sure, 
though  it  was  likely  that  he  would  make  a  loss  at  prices  significantly  lower  than  this  point 





A total of 18 sessions were run (5 sessions for each SR treatment and 4 sessions for each LR 
treatment
14). In only 3 sessions out of 18 was a  bankruptcy recorded. One bankruptcy occurred at 
the 19
th auction during a session of the SR/FI treatment. Another occurred at the 4
th auction during 
a session of the LR/NI treatment. And the third occurred at the 15
th auction during a session of the 
                                                 
13  We used the term “group value” to refer to common value, “group value signal” to refer to common value signal 
and “individual value to refer to private value in the experiment.   
14  The original design was to have 4 sessions for each treatment. However, substantial variation among sessions was 
found in the SR treatments. We suspected that it might because of session effect and decided to collect more data for 
the SR treatment.   14 
SR/NI treatment.
15  Results 1, 2 and 3 below focus on the performance of revenue, winner‟s profit 
and efficiency respectively. Each of them provides the result comparing FI and NI and actual 
auction performance relative to the Nash prediction. In the linear mixed effects models that support 
the  results,  auctions  are  indexed  by  r  and  sessions  are  indexed  by  j.  Informationj  =1  if  full 
information is provided in session j and 0 otherwise. Auction_noj is the auction number in session j. 
αj, the random effect for session j, and εrj, are error terms that are assumed to  be distributed 
normally with a zero mean. Result 4 reports the effect of bidding information on bidders‟ reentry. 
Result 5 answers whether there is any relationship between reentry activities and winners‟ profits. 
All data are reported in terms of e-dollars.     
 
Result 1a. Providing bidding information has no effect on revenue. 
 
Support. The hypothesis that revenue under NI treatment equals to revenue under FI treatment is 
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      (3) 
 
Revenuerj is the price that winner paid in auction r in session j. Predicted_pricer is the Nash 
equilibrium  price  prediction  in  auction  r  and  price Predicted _   is  the  mean  predicted  price.   
Predicted_pricer is added to the model to explain the movement of revenue due to the difference of 
equilibrium  price  across  auctions.  For  sessions  without  information,  equilibrium  prices  are 
                                                 
15  Because the bidder who went bankrupt in the SR/NI treatment reported that the reason he went bankrupt was that he 
was busy calculating and forgot to pay attention to the bidding screen, data from the 15th period has not been used in 
our analysis.   15 
calculated based on the second price sealed bid equilibrium bidding strategy. For sessions with 
information, equilibrium prices are calculated based on equilibrium bidding strategy of English 
auction.α is the intercept of the model, which represents the expected mean revenue at auction 10 
of NI treatment when evaluated at the average predicted price (1002.15 for SR and 991.44 for LR). 
If information has no effect on revenue, 1  ,  4    and  5  will not be significantly different from 0 
and the joint hypothesis that  1  = 4  = 5  =0 will not be rejected. Results are shown in Table 2.   
 
[Table 2 here] 
 
It is clear that the effect of bidding information on revenue is insignificant (the hypothesis that 
1  = 4  = 5  =0 cannot be rejected for both SR and LR).   
We observed that auction number can partially explain the movement of revenue in NI and FI of 
SR and in FI of LR ( 3  is significantly different from 0 for SR at a 10% level, and the joint 
hypothesis that  3  + 5  =0 is rejected at a 1% level for SR and at a 10% level for LR). Since this 
observation is not predicted by the theory, it leads us to test the hypothesis that the winning bid 
equals the Nash prediction (see result 1b). ◆   
 
 
Result 1b. Actual revenue is significantly different from the Nash revenue prediction in SR/NI at a 
10% level; it is significantly different from the Nash revenue prediction in LR/NI at a 5% level and 
in SR/FI and LR/FI at a 1% level. 
     
Support. We test the hypothesis that revenue equals to the Nash prediction using the following 
linear mixed effects model for each SR/NI, SR/FI, LR/NI and LR/FI treatments: 
 
rj j j r rj no Auction price Predicted Revenue           ) 10 _ ( _ 1   (4)   16 
 
α is the intercept of the model, which represents the expected difference between actual revenue 
and the Nash predicted price in auction 10. The definition of other variables follows that in model 
(3). If the actual price is not different from the Nash prediction, we would expect that the joint 
hypothesis that   = 1  =0 will not be rejected. Results are shown in Table 3. The p-values of the 
joint hypothesis   = 1  =0 are 0.0709, 0.0000, 0.0483 and 0.0035 for SR/NI, SR/FI, LR/NI and 
LR/FI respectively. ◆ 
 
[Table 3 here] 
 
Although information does not have an effect on revenue in general, the repeated nature of the 
experiment  tends  to  lower  revenue  in  SR  and  this  tendency  is  more  severe  when  bidding 
information is provided. From table 3,  1  =-0.4 for SR/NI and  1  =-0.87 for SR/FI. The negative 
sign  of  these  two  coefficients  shows  that  relative  to  the  predicted  revenue,  actual  revenue  is 
decreasing through out the experiment. Combined with the intercept term, these estimates show 
that at the beginning of the experiment (i.e. auction 1), actual revenue is higher than the predicted 
one (expected difference is -1.16+(-0.4)(-9)=2.44 for SR/NI and 0.82+(-0.87)(-9)=8.65 for SR/FI). 
The situation reverses near the end of the experiment (at auction 20, the expected difference is 
-1.16+(-0.4)(10)=-5.16  for  SR/NI  and  0.82+(-0.87)(10)=-7.88  for  SR/FI).  The  rate  of  revenue 
decrease in FI is more than double the rate in NI.     
 
In LR/NI, the actual revenue is lower than the predicted one at the beginning of the experiment (at 
auction 1, expected difference is -9.96+(1.12)(-9)=-20.04) and gradually increases and becomes 
higher than the Nash predicted (at auction 20, expected difference is -9.96+(1.12)(10)=1.24). In 
LR/FI, the actual revenue is lower than the predicted one through out the experiment (at auction 1, 
expected  difference  is  -19.93+(1.77)(-9)=-35.86  and  at  auction  20,  expected  difference  is   17 
-19.93+(1.77)(10)=-2.23) .   
 
One possible explanation of the reverse tendency of actual revenue relative to predicted in SR and 
LR is that since common value uncertainty in SR is low, bidders become “comfortable” bidding in 
SR more quickly and therefore the auctions become highly competitive earlier in the experiment. 
Because of the repeated nature of the experiment, bidders gradually realize that bidding 
aggressively hurts their profits and they lower their bids; they learn this faster when bidding 
information is provided. On the other hand, because of the high common value uncertainly in LR, 
bidders tend to bid cautiously at the beginning of the experiment and the initial auctions are far 
from competitive; bidders gradually become familiar with the environment and become more 
competitive. It is interesting to notice that when bidding information is provided, bidders are 
bidding more aggressive at the beginning of the experiment in SR (comparing expected difference 
of actual and predicted revenue of 2.44 for SR/NI and of 8.65 for SR/FI at auction 1); while in LR, 
bidders are bidding more cautiously when information is provided (comparing expected difference 
of actual and predicted revenue of -20.04 for LR/NI and of -34.73 for LR/FI at auction 1). 
Interestingly, this suggests that bidders‟ reaction to information is not uniform; it depends on the 
size of the uncertainty (the range of the common value signal). 
 
While examining the fitted model for result 1a, we found that the model for LR needs to be 
corrected for heteroscedasticity in terms of different information treatments. This leads us to 
suspect that the variability of revenue in different information treatments is different.   
 
Result 1c. The variance of difference between actual revenue and predicted revenue is 
substantially larger in FI than in NI for LR. However, it is essentially the same in FI and NI for SR.   
 
Support. The variance of error for model (4) is reported in table 3. 
2
    is 94.38 and 94.09 for   18 
SR/NI and SR/FI respectively. However, 
2
    increases by 84.7% from 502.52 for LR/NI to 
928.29 for LR/FI. ◆ 
 
Result 1c complements the discussion in result 1b suggesting that bidders react to information 
differently under different range of uncertainty. Result 2a and 2c give further support to this insight 
from the winner‟s profit perspective. 
   
Result 2a. The magnitude of the effect of information depends on the level of Nash predicted profit. 
In the small range treatment, when the level of the Nash predicted profit increases, profits increase 
faster than when there is no information provided. Just the opposite occurs in the large range 
treatment. 
 
Support. The hypothesis that winner‟s profit under NI treatment equals to winner‟s profit under FI 
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   (5) 
 
Profitrj is the profit earned by the winner in auction r in session j. Predicted_Profitr is the actual 
value  of  the  predicted  winner  minus  the  equilibrium  price  predicted  in  auction  r. 
profit Predicted _   is  the  mean  predicted  profit. α  is  the  intercept  of  the  model,  which  is  the 
expected profit in auction 10 of NI when predicted profit is 6.44 for SR and is 8.17 for LR. If 
information has no effect on winner‟s profit, we would expect that 1  ,  4    and  5  are individually 
insignificantly different from 0 and that the joint hypothesis test that  1  = 4  = 5  =0 cannot be   19 
rejected. Results are shown in Table 4. 
 
[Table 4 here] 
 
Results show that information has a significant effect on revenue in SR but not in LR (hypothesis 
test of  1  = 4  = 5  =0 has a p-value of 0.0269 and 0.2396 for SR and LR respectively). Results 
indicate that the effect of information depends on the predicted profit; 4  has a low p-value of 
0.0058 and 0.0556 for SR and LR respectively. Providing information generates different levels of 
profit for winners when the predicted profit varies. Notice that when the predicted profit is greater, 
actual profit is greater ( 2   is positive). Because 4   is positive and significant (at the 1% level) in 
the SR treatment, the data suggests that when the predicted profit is greater, the actual profit is 
greater if information is provided. The top panel of figure 1 is a scatter plot of Nash predicted 
profit versus actual profit in the SR treatment. The fitted regression lines for FI and NI indicate that 
the actual profit under FI is less than that under NI for lower values of predicted profit, but FI 
profit surpasses NI profit as the Nash prediction increases.     
 
[Figure 1 here] 
 
Because 4   is  negative  and  significant  (at  the  10%  level)  in  the  LR  treatment,  the  data  also 
suggests  that  when  the  predicted  profit  is  greater,  the  actual  profit  is  lower  if  information  is 
provided. The bottom panel of figure 1 is a scatter plot of Nash predicted profit versus actual profit 
in the LR treatment. The fitted regression lines for FI and NI indicate that the actual profit under 
NI is less than that under FI for lower values of predicted profit, but NI profit surpasses FI profit as 
the Nash prediction increases.   
 
Results further indicate that actual profit can be partially explained by auction number in the   20 
information treatment (the joint hypothesis test of  3  + 5  =0 gives a very low p-value of 0.0248 
for the SR model). This leads us to test the hypothesis that profit equals the Nash prediction (see 
result 2b). ◆ 
 
Although this result cannot tell us the specific effect information will have on the winner‟s profit 
when considering whether information should be provided during a particular auction, it provides 
insights  into  the  interaction  of  information  and  the  level  of  predicted  profit.  Specifically,  it 
suggests what auction format (whether information is provided) a bidder might prefer. Consider a 
bidder who thinks that the range of uncertainty is small and the Nash predicted profit is high; he 
would rather participate in an ascending auction where information is provided because the actual 
profit can be expected to be higher. If he thinks that the Nash predicted profit is low, he would 
prefer an ascending auction where no information is disclosed. The bidder will make opposite 
choices if he thinks that the range of uncertainty is large. This line of reasoning is summarized by 
the following table: 
 
[Table 5 here] 
 
Result 2b. While actual profit is not significantly different from the Nash profit prediction in SR/NI 
and LR/NI, it is significantly different from the Nash profit prediction in SR/FI and in LR/FI. 
 
Support. We test the hypothesis that actual profit equals the Nash prediction using the following 
linear mixed effects model for each SR/NI, SR/FI, LR/NI and LR/FI treatment: 
 
rj j j r rj no Auction Profit Predicted Profit           ) 10 _ ( _ 1   (6) 
 
α is the intercept of the model, which represents the expected difference between actual profit and   21 
the Nash predicted profit in auction 10. The definition of other variables follows that in model (5). 
If the actual profit is not different from the Nash prediction, we would expect the joint hypothesis 
test that   = 1  =0 cannot be rejected.    Results are shown in Table 6. Results show that actual 
profit is not statistically significantly different from the Nash predicted profit in SR/NI and LR/NI, 
but it is statistically significantly different from Nash predicted profit in SR/FI at a 1% level and in 
LR/FI at a 10% level. ◆ 
 
Bidders on average earn higher than Nash predicted profit in all auctions in LR/FI (table 6 shows 
that model (4) estimates to be 13.54 and estimate 1  to be insignificantly different from 0). Result 
2b shows that bidders do not suffer from winner‟s curse in SR/NI, LR/NI and LR/FI.
16  Figure 2 
shows a box plot of average profit compared with Nash prediction under different treatments. We 
can see that in the LR condition, even when bidding information is not provided, bidders earn 
more than the Nash prediction. In the SR condition bidders earn close to the Nash prediction when 
information is not provided. Although bidders earn less than Nash prediction in SR/FI, they earn a 
positive profit on average. The result of not suffering from winners‟ curse is contrary to results 
from pure common value environments (Kagel and Levin, 1996)
17  and the experimental analysis 
of first price seal bid auctions under an environment with both private and common value 
components (Goeree and Offerman, 2002). This suggests that the simultaneous conditions of 
having a private value component in the bidder‟s valuation function and using an ascending 
                                                 
16  Kagel (1995) defines the deviation from bidding above the expected value given one has the highest signal value 
as a measure of the extent a bidder suffers from winner‟s curse. Nash equilibrium predicts that a bidder bids assuming 
that all remaining bidders‟ are the same as him when information is provided and his signal is the same as the second 
highest one when information is not provided. This condition is more stringent than the expected value condition. In 
other words, a bidder following the Nash bidding would bid lower than what he would have bid by simply avoiding 
the winner‟s curse. And a bidder who bids simply by avoiding the winner‟s curse would earn less profit than the one 
who follows Nash strategy. Since the actual profits our bidders earned were not significantly different from the Nash 
predictions in SR/NI and LR/NI, and even higher in LR/FI, we conclude that our bidders do not suffer from winner‟s 
curse in these conditions.   
17  Kagel and Levin (1996) report inexperienced and one-time experienced bidders earn negative profit on average in 
English auctions in a common value environment. Note that there is a subtle difference between how the common 
value signals are determined in (Kagel and Levin, 1996) and in this paper. While bidders‟ common value signals are 
independent in this paper, the signals in (Kagel and Levin, 1996) are affiliated (as defined in (Milgrom and Weber, 
1982)).   22 
auction are necessary to help bidders avoid the winner‟s curse. 
 
[Figure 2 here] 
 
Again, while examining the model for result 2a, we correct the heteroscedasticity in terms of 
different information treatments for LR. We suspect the variability of winners‟ profits is different 
for NI and FI and report it in the following result. 
 
Result 2c. The variance of difference between actual profit and predicted profit decreases from NI 
to FI for SR. However, it substantially increases from NI to FI for LR.   
 
Support. The variance of error for model (6) is reported in table 6. 
2
    decreases 24.1 % when 
comparing SR/NI (150.75) and SR/FI (114.44). However, 
2
    increases by 80.78% from 616.37 
for LR/NI to 1114.25 for LR/FI. ◆ 
 
Result  2c  again  suggests  the  non-uniform  effect  of  information  on  auction  performance. 
Information does not necessarily stabilize bidders‟ earnings. In fact, the variability of winners‟ 
profits slightly decreases when information is provided in SR. However, the variability of winners‟ 
profits dramatically increases when information is provided in the LR treatment. 
 
Result 3a. Providing bidding information has no effect on efficiency. 
 




winner  , 
where vwinner is the value of the winner (pwinner+C) and vmax is the value of the bidder with the   23 
maximum  private  value  drawn  (pmax+C).  The  hypothesis  that  efficiency  under  NI  equals  to 
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Efficiencyrj  is  the  efficiency  in  auction  r  in  session  j.  α  is  the  intercept  of  the  model,  which 
represents the expected mean efficiency at auction 10 of NI treatment. If information has no effect 
on efficiency, we would expect that β1 and 3  are individually insignificantly different from 0 and 
that the joint hypothesis test that  1  = 3  =0 cannot be rejected. Results are shown in Table 7. 
The test result gives a p-value of 0.7382 for the SR treatment and a p-value of 0.4689 for the LR 
treatment. Therefore, the information effect under the two range treatments is insignificant.    ◆ 
 
[Table 7 here] 
 
Since  2    in table 7 is insignificantly different from 0 for both SR and LR, the efficiency is not 
explained by auction number in the NI treatments. However, the hypothesis test that  2  + 3  =0 is 
rejected at a 10% level for LR, this indicates that auction number may partially explain efficiency 
in LR. We test the hypothesis that efficiency equals the Nash prediction in SR and LR (Result 3b). 
Surprisingly, it shows that the theory‟s prediction on efficiency is not good in SR as well. 
 
Result 3b. Actual efficiency is significantly lower than the Nash efficiency prediction in both SR 
and LR treatments. 
                                                 
18  Since the Nash predicted efficiency is the same for all periods in SR (equal 1), we encounter singularity problem 
when we estimate models that include predicted efficiency as an independent variable. Therefore, we choose a model 
different from those we use for estimating revenue and profit. To maintain consistency, we estimated the same model 
for SR and LR.   24 
 
Support.  We  test  the  hypothesis  that  actual  efficiency  equals  the  Nash  prediction  using  the 
following linear mixed effects model for each SR/NI, SR/FI, LR/NI and LR/FI treatment: 
 
rj j j r rj Auction_no Efficiency Predicted Efficiency           ) 10 (   _ 1  
 
Predicted_Efficiencyr is the Nash equilibrium efficiency prediction in auction r. α is the intercept 
of the model, which represents the expected difference between actual efficiency and the Nash 
predicted efficiency in auction 10. The definition of other variables follows that in model (7). If the 
actual efficiency is not different from the Nash prediction, we would expect the joint hypothesis 
test  that   = 1  =0  cannot  be  rejected.  Results  are  shown  in  Table  8.  We  observe  that  the 
hypothesis that actual efficiency is equal to the Nash predicted is rejected at a 1% level for SR/NI 
and LR/FI and at a 5% level for SR/FI and LR/NI. ◆ 
 
[Table 8 here] 
 
Besides the observation that actual efficiency does not equal to the Nash prediction, we observe, 
from table 8, that relative to predicted efficiency, actual efficiency rises along with auction number 
in LR/FI ( 1    has a positive estimate and is significantly different from 0). This observation is not 
found in other treatments. 
 
We again observe a heteroscedasticity problem in the model estimated in result 3a. In fact, the 
variability of efficiency is higher in NI than in FI for SR. However, since the changes in efficiency 
are infinitesimal, we choose not to report this result in detail. 
 
Result 4. The number of reentries is not significantly different between FI and NI in both SR and   25 
LR treatments. However, the number of reentries is significantly greater than 0 in both SR and LR 
treatments. 
 
Support. Theory predicts that bidders would not utilize the reentry options under either treatment 
and therefore the numbers of reentries under both treatments would equal zero. We formally test 
the  hypothesis  that  the  numbers  of  reentries  are  equal  between  FI  and  NI  using  a  two-sided 
Wilcoxon Rank Sum test. The average number of reentries per subject per auction in a session is 
the unit of observation. The number of observations for the SR treatment and LR treatment are 5 
and 4 respectively. The test result gives a p-value of 0.3016 for the SR treatment and a p-value of 
0.6286 for the LR treatment.   
 
We use a one-sided Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test to test the null hypothesis that the number of 
reentries (which cannot be less than zero) per bidder per auction in a session exactly equals zero. 
The average number of reentries per bidder per auction in a session is the unit of observation. 
Number of observations for the SR treatment and LR treatment are 5 and 4 respectively. The 
descriptive statistics and test results for the average number of reentries per bidder per auction are 
summarized in table 9. The null hypothesis that the number of reentries in SR equals zero is 
rejected at a 5% level (p-value=0.0313 for SR/FI, p-value=0.0313 for SR/NI). The null hypothesis 
that the number of reentry in LR equals zero is rejected at a 10% level (p-value=0.0625 for LR/FI, 
p-value=0.0625 for LR/NI). ◆ 
 
Bidders do make use of reentry when making their decisions: this leads us to enquire whether the 
bidder‟s perceived value in reentering manifests itself in increased profit for winners who engage 
in such strategy (result 5).   
 
[Table 9 here]   26 
 
Result 5. The winners who engage in reentry do not earn higher profit than those who do not 
engage in it. 
 
Support. We find that the average normalized profit (actual profit – Nash predicted profit) for 
winners who engage in reentry (i.e. reenter at least one time in winning an auction) is higher than 
that of the average normalized profit for winners who do not engage in reentry only in the LR/FI 
treatment. The difference is insignificant (p-value for two-sided t-test is 0.8048). Figure 3 shows 
the average normalized profit in different treatments. The average number of reentries for the 
winners who reenter on the way to winning are 1.56, 2, 1.73 and 1.2 for treatments SR/FI, SR/NI, 
LR/FI and LR/NI respectively. ◆ 
 




The model considered in this paper provides a theoretical proposition that bidding information is 
not beneficial to any party in an English auction where objects have a certain private plus uncertain 
common component to value. We test the model and find that information alone does not have a 
significant effect on expected revenue and expected efficiency. However, information does have an 
effect on expected profit when taking into account the range of public uncertainty and the level of 
Nash profit prediction, which cannot be known a priori. There is no evidence that bidders suffer 
from winners‟ curse when information is not provided in this environment for both small and large 
range of uncertainty. In fact, in the treatment where the common value component has a larger 
range, winners tend to earn more profit than Nash prediction on average. However, in the smaller 
range treatment where information is provided, winners earn slightly less than the Nash prediction   27 
but their average profit remains positive. We observe that at the beginning of the experiment, the 
expected revenue in the information treatment is higher than that of the no information treatment 
relative to the predicted revenue when the uncertainty in the common value component is small, 
while  the  opposite  occurs  when  the  uncertainty  in  the  common  value  component  is  large. 
Furthermore, information has no effect on the variability of revenue and decreases the variability 
of winners‟ profits when the uncertainty is small, while it substantially increases the variability of 
revenue and winners‟ profits when the uncertainty is large. Combined with the information effect 
on winners‟ expected profits, these findings suggest that bidders‟ response to information is not 
uniform;  it  depends  on  the  uncertainty  level  of  the  common  value  component.  Although  a 
significant number of reentries is observed, the data do not show that winners who engage in 
reentry earn higher profits. 
 
We  find  no  evidence  that  bidding  information  is  beneficial  to  auction  performance  in  our 
environment. It appears that bidders do not suffer from the winner‟s curse when there is a private 
value component in the valuation function combined with an ascending auction. This suggests that 
auction designers need not worry much about bidders losing money in open ascending auctions. 
The  effect  of  bidding  information  under  different  environments  still  waits  to  be  tested.  For 
example, auction theory suggests that when bidders‟ signals are affiliated, providing information 
will raise more revenue for the seller. A two-signal model in which common value signals are 
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Table 1: Treatment Design 
  Only Clock Price Reported    Bidders‟ Identity Reported 
Small Range (SR)  SR/NI  SR/FI 
Large Range (LR)  LR/NI  LR/FI 
Caption: This 2X2 design relates two Information treatments, one that provides no information concerning 
bidder drop-out and reentry decision at each clock price and one that supplies only the clock price; the 
second treatment examines the range from which the common value component signals are drawn that is a 
mean-preserving spread. 
   31 
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where  ) , 0 ( ~       ), , 0 ( ~
2 2
      N N rj j  
  Estimate    Std. Error  DF  t-statistic    p-value 
Small Range 
Intercept ( )  1000.94  1.92  179  521.16  0.0000 
Information ( 1  )  2.04  2.70  8  0.76  0.4718 
(Predicted_price-1002.15) ( 2  )  0.96  0.11  179  8.89  0.0000 
(Auction_no - 10) ( 3  )  -0.41  0.21  179  -1.93  0.0558 
(Information x (Predicted_price-1002.15)) ( 4  )  -0.24  0.15  179  -1.57  0.1176 
Information x (Auction_no - 10) ( 5  )  -0.47  0.29  179  -1.61  0.1097 
H0:  1  = 4  = 5  =0      Wald statistic=5.63      DF=3      p-value=0.1308 
H0:  3  + 5  =0        t-statistic =-4.35      DF=179      p-value=0.0000 
Large Range 
Intercept ( )  979.49  8.97  132  109.22  0.0000 
Information ( 1  )  -7.90  12.70  6  -0.62  0.5567 
(Predicted_price-991.44) ( 2  )  0.42  0.11  132  3.75  0.0003 
(Auction_no - 10) ( 3  )  0.66  0.60  132  1.09  0.2760 
(Information x (Predicted_price-991.44)) ( 4  )  -0.17  0.17  132  -1.05  0.2937 
Information x (Auction_no - 10) ( 5  )  -0.49  0.91  132  0.54  0.5904 
H0:  1  = 4  = 5  =0      Wald statistic=1.98      DF=3      p-value=0.5761 
H0:  3  + 5  =0        t-statistic =1.67      DF=132      p-value=0.0977 
 
Caption: Information has no effect on revenue in both small range and large range of the common value 
signals. The significance of  3    for small range and the low p-value of the hypothesis test that  3  + 5  =0 
for both small range and large range indicate that auction number partially explain actual revenue in both no 
information and information treatments. 
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Table 3: Estimates of Linear Mixed-Effects Model for the Difference between Actual Revenue and 
Nash Predicted Revenue   
rj j j r rj no Auction price Predicted Revenue           ) 10 _ ( _ 1       
where  ) , 0 ( ~       ), , 0 ( ~
2 2
      N N rj j  
  Estimate    Std. Error  DF  t-statistic    p-value 
SR/NI 
Intercept ( )  -1.16  2.07  88  -0.56  0.5776 
(Auction_no-10) ( 1  )  -0.40  0.18  88  -2.23  0.0280 
Estimate of variance of error (
2
  ): 94.38 
H0:   = 1  =0      Wald statistic=5.29      DF=2      p-value=0.0709 
SR/FI 
Intercept ( )  0.82  1.81  93  0.45  0.6526 
(Auction_no-10) ( 1  )  -0.87  0.17  93  -5.11  0.0000 
Estimate of variance of error (
2
  ): 94.09 
H0:   = 1  =0      Wald statistic=26.23      DF=2      p-value=0.0000 
LR/NI 
Intercept ( )  -9.96  11.85  59  -0.84  0.4039 
(Auction_no-10) ( 1  )  1.12  0.50  59  2.27  0.0271 
Estimate of variance of error (
2
  ): 502.52 
H0:   = 1  =0      Wald statistic=6.06      DF=2      p-value=0.0483 
LR/FI 
Intercept ( )  -19.93  7.96  75  -2.50  0.0145 
(Auction_no-10) ( 1  )  1.77  0.75  75  2.36  0.0207 
Estimate of variance of error (
2
  ): 928.29 
H0:   = 1  =0      Wald statistic=11.32      DF=2      p-value=0.0035 
Legend:  SR:  Small  range  of  uncertainty  treatment,  LR:  Large  range  of  uncertainty  treatment,  NI:  No 
Information treatment, FI: Full Information treatment 
Caption: The hypothesis that actual revenue equals Nash predicted revenue is rejected at a 10% level for 
SR/NI, at a 5% level for LR/NI and at a 1% level for FI in both SR and LR. Relative to predicted revenue, 
actual revenue decreases in both NI and FI of SR but increases in LR through out the experiment. Providing 
information does not have an effect on the variability of revenue in SR but it substantially increases the 
variability of revenue in LR.   33 
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      N N rj j  
  Estimate    Std. Error  DF  t-statistic    p-value 
Small Range 
Intercept ( )  5.23  1.62  179  3.22  0.0015 
Information ( 1  )  -1.84  2.27  8  -0.81  0.4419 
(Predicted_profit-6.44) ( 2  )  0.48  0.12  179  3.96  0.0001 
(Auction_no - 10) ( 3  )  0.09  0.25  179  0.35  0.7269 
(Information x (Predicted_profit-6.44)) ( 4  )  0.47  0.17  179  2.79  0.0058 
Information x (Auction_no - 10) ( 5  )  0.46  0.35  179  1.31  0.1933 
H0:  1  = 4  = 5  =0      Wald statistic=9.19     DF=3     p-value=0.0269 
H0:  3  + 5  =0        t-statistic =0.55      DF=179      p-value=0.0248 
Large Range 
Intercept ( )  15.50  8.51  132  1.82  0.0710 
Information ( 1  )  6.06  12.07  6  0.50  0.6335 
(Predicted_profit-8.17) ( 2  )  1.37  0.18  132  7.61  0.0000 
(Auction_no - 10) ( 3  )  -0.32  0.66  132  -0.49  0.6276 
Information x (Predicted_profit-8.17) ( 4  )  -0.51  0.26  132  -1.93  0.0556 
Information x (Auction_no - 10) ( 5  )  -0.70  1.01  132  -0.69  0.4893 
H0:  1  = 4  = 5  =0      Wald statistic=4.21     DF=3     p-value=0.2396 
H0:  3  + 5  =0        t-statistic =-1.34      DF=132      p-value=0.1814 
 
Caption: For small range of the common value signals, the regression estimates show that information has a 
significant effect on profit (Hypothesis  1  = 4  = 5  =0 is rejected). Information has an interaction effect 
with  Nash  predicted  profit  (p-value  of  hypothesis 4  =0  is  0.0058).  Auction  number  partially  explains 
movement of actual profit in information treatment (p-value of hypothesis 3  + 5  =0 is 0.0248).   
For large range of the common value signals, the effect of information alone is insignificant. However, there 
is an interaction effect between information and the Nash prediction (p-value of hypothesis 4  =0 is 0.0556).   34 
Table 5: Bidders’ Preferences of Auction Formats given Different Levels of Nash Predicted Profit and 
Different Ranges of Uncertainty 
  High Nash predicted profit  Low Nash predicted profit 
Small range of uncertainty (SR)  Full Information (FI) preferred  No Information (NI) preferred 
Large range of uncertainty (LR)  No Information (NI) preferred  Full Information (FI) preferred 
Caption: The availability of information has an effect on winner‟s profit that is dependent on the level of 
Nash profit prediction and the range of uncertainty. A bidder who thinks that the range of uncertainty is 
small  and  the  Nash  predicted  profit  is  high  would  rather  participate  in  an  ascending  auction  where 
information is provided because the actual profit is higher. If he thinks that the predicted profit is low, he 
would  prefer  an  ascending  auction  where  no  information  is  disclosed.  The  bidder  will  make  opposite 
choices if he thinks that the range of uncertainty is large. 
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Figure  1:    Actual  Profit  Plots  against  Nash  Predicted  Profit  under  Small  (top  panel)  and  Large 






























































Caption: Actual profit is the average of auction profit across sessions. In the small range of uncertainty 
treatment, winner‟s profit in full information (FI) treatment is less than winner‟s profit in no information 
(NI) initially but it catches up later. In the large range of uncertainty treatment, winner‟s profit in FI is more 
than winner‟s profit in NI when predicted profit is less but the results of profit comparison reverses when 
predicted profit is large.     36 
Table 6: Estimates of Linear Mixed-Effects Model for the Difference between Actual Profit and Nash 
Predicted Profit   
rj j j r rj no Auction Profit Predicted Profit           ) 10 _ ( _ 1    
  where  ) , 0 ( ~       ), , 0 ( ~
2 2
      N N rj j    
  Estimate    Std. Error  DF  t-statistic    p-value 
SR/NI 
Intercept ( )  -1.04  1.72  88  -0.61  0.5464 
(Auction_no-10) ( 1  )  0.27  0.27  88  1.03  0.3048 
Estimate of variance of error (
2
  ): 150.75 
H0:   = 1  =0      Wald statistic=1.43      DF=2      p-value=0.4898 
SR/FI 
Intercept ( )  -3.08  1.52  93  -2.03  0.0450 
(Auction_no-10) ( 1  )  0.56  0.23  93  2.41  0.0181 
Estimate of variance of error (
2
  ): 114.44 
H0:   = 1  =0      Wald statistic=9.35      DF=2      p-value=0.0093 
LR/NI 
Intercept ( )  4.80  12.22  59  0.39  0.6957 
(Auction_no-10) ( 1  )  -0.73  0.55  59  -1.33  0.1898 
Estimate of variance of error (
2
  ): 616.37 
H0:   = 1  =0      Wald statistic=1.98      DF=2      p-value=0.3722 
LR/FI 
Intercept ( )  13.30  6.95  75  1.91  0.0596 
(Auction_no-10) ( 1  )  -0.99  0.78  75  -1.27  0.2098 
Estimate of variance of error (
2
  ): 1114.25 
H0:   = 1  =0      Wald statistic=5.00      DF=2      p-value=0.0819 
Legend:  SR:  Small  range  of  uncertainty  treatment,  LR:  Large  range  of  uncertainty  treatment,  NI:  No 
Information treatment, FI: Full Information treatment 
Caption: Actual profit is statistically significantly different from the Nash prediction for both SR (at 1% 
level) and LR (at 10% level) when bidding information is provided. Relative to Nash profit prediction, 
actual profit rises along with auction number for SR/FI (p-value of hypothesis  1  =0 is 0.0181). When 
comparing to NI, FI decreases the variability of winner‟s profit in SR. However, it dramatically increases 
the variability of winner‟s profit in LR.     37 







































Caption: Actual profit is the average of profit across all auctions and all sessions. Nash profit is the average 
of Nash predictions of each auction. In the large range of uncertainty (LR) treatment, even when bidding 
information is not provided (NI), bidders earn more than the Nash prediction on average. In the small range 
of uncertainty (SR) treatment bidders earn close to the Nash prediction when information is not provided. 
Although bidders earn less than Nash prediction in small range of uncertainty (SR) and full information (FI) 
condition, they on average earn positive profit. 
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Table 7: Estimates of Linear Mixed-Effects Model for Efficiency 
rj j j
j j j rj
no Auction n Informatio
no Auction n Informatio Efficiency
 
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    
) 10 _ (                                      
) 10 _ (  
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where  ) , 0 ( ~       ), , 0 ( ~
2 2
      N N rj j  
  Estimate    Std. Error  DF  t-statistic    p-value 
Small Range 
Intercept ( )  0.9966  0.0011  181  875.08  0.0000 
Information ( 1  )  0.0002  0.0016  8  0.1542  0.8813 
(Auction_no - 10) ( 2  )  -0.0000006  0.0001  181  -0.0056  0.9956 
Information x (Auction_no - 10) ( 3  )  -0.0001  0.0001  181  -0.7653  0.4451 
H0:  1  = 3  =0      Wald statistic=0.61      DF=2      p-value=0.7382 
H0:  2  + 3  =0        t-statistic =-1.30      DF=181      p-value=0.1969 
Large Range 
Intercept ( )  0.9928  0.0019  134  532.74  0.0000 
Information ( 1  )  -0.0016  0.0025  6  -0.6311  0.5513 
(Auction_no - 10) ( 2  )  0.0001  0.0002  134  0.2834  0.7773 
Information x (Auction_no - 10) ( 3  )  0.0003  0.0003  134  1.0615  0.2904 
H0:  1  = 3  =0      Wald statistic=1.51      DF=2      p-value=0.4689 
H0:  2  + 3  =0        t-statistic =1.89      DF=134      p-value=0.0607 
Caption: The regression estimates show that information has no effect on efficiency for both small range 
and large range of the common value signals. However, the significant result of the hypothesis test of 
2  + 3  =0 for large range of the common value signals suggests that auction number may partially explain 
the movement of actual efficiency in information treatment. 
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Table 8: Estimates of Linear Mixed-Effects Model for the Difference between Actual Efficiency and 
Nash Predicted Efficiency   
rj j r rj Efficiency Predicted Efficiency           ) 10 o (Auction_n   _ j 1  
where  ) , 0 ( ~       ), , 0 ( ~
2 2
      N N rj j  
  Estimate    Std. Error  DF  t-statistic    p-value 
SR/NI 
Information ( )  -0.0033  0.0006  88  -5.38  0.0000 
(Auction_no-10) ( 1  )  0.000001  0.0001  88  0.01  0.9913 
H0:   = 1  =0      Wald statistic=28.98      DF=2      p-value=0.0000 
SR/FI 
Information ( )  -0.0031  0.0014  93  -2.25  0.0268 
(Auction_no-10) ( 1  )  -0.0001  0.0001  93  -1.31  0.1920 
H0:   = 1  =0      Wald statistic=6.93      DF=2      p-value=0.0312 
LR/NI 
Information ( )  -0.0054  0.0024  59  -2.27  0.0270 
(Auction_no-10) ( 1  )  0.0003  0.0002  59  1.35  0.1824 
H0:   = 1  =0      Wald statistic=7.31      DF=2      p-value=0.0259 
LR/FI 
Information ( )  -0.0069  0.0013  75  -5.34  0.0000 
(Auction_no-10) ( 1  )  0.0007  0.0002  75  2.98  0.0039 
H0:   = 1  =0      Wald statistic=34.89      DF=2      p-value=0.0000 
Legend:  SR:  Small  range  of  uncertainty  treatment,  LR:  Large  range  of  uncertainty  treatment,  NI:  No 
Information treatment, FI: Full Information treatment 
Caption: Actual efficiency is statistically significantly different from the Nash prediction for both SR and 
LR under different information treatments. Relative to Nash efficiency prediction, actual efficiency rises 
along with auction number for LR/FI (p-value of hypothesis 1  =0 is 0.0039).   
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Table  9:  Descriptive  Statistics  and  Test  Results  for  the  Average  Number  of  Reentries  per 
Bidder per Auction 
  SR/FI  SR/NI  LR/FI  LR/NI 
Mean  0.19  0.12  0.77  0.16 
Standard Deviation  0.17  0.11  0.97  0.08 
p-value  (one  sided  Wilcoxon 
Signed-Rank Test) 
Ha:Number of reentries >0 
0.0313  0.0313  0.0625  0.0625 
Legend:  SR:  Small  range  of  uncertainty  treatment,  LR:  Large  range  of  uncertainty  treatment,  NI:  No 
Information treatment, FI: Full Information treatment 
Caption: The null hypothesis that the number of reentries in small range of uncertainty treatment equals 
zero is rejected at a 5% level. The null hypothesis that the number of reentry in large range of uncertainty 
equals zero is rejected at a 10% level.   41 
   











































Legend:  SR:  Small  range  of  uncertainty  treatment,  LR:  Large  range  of  uncertainty  treatment,  NI:  No 
Information treatment, FI: Full Information treatment 
Caption: Normalized profit (actual profit – Nash predicted profit) is averaged across all auctions and all 
sessions for winners. Winners who have reenter at least one time are classified into the w/ reentry category, 
otherwise they are classified into the w/o reentry category. The average normalized profit for winners w/ 
reentry is found to be higher than that of the average normalized profit for winners w/o reentry only in 
LR/FI.   




Bidder’s Screen Shot 
 
Caption: This is a capture of bidder 1‟s screen.    The bidder is in auction 1 and he has a private value of 498 
and signal of the common value of 513.    If the bidder uses is common value of signal of 513 as the 
estimate of the average of the common value signals his expected total value would be 1011.    At the 
current price of 966 Bidder 1 is still demanding a unit and at the past price of 965 bidders 1, 2, 3 and 4 were 
also demanding the unit.    Bidder 1 also has current cash account of 50, so that if the experiment ended 
with no further allocation to Bidder 1, he would make 50 e-dollars.   43 
Instruction (small range of uncertainty, bidding information provided) 
 
Welcome! You are going to participate in a decision experiment. The instructions for this 
experiment are simple. If you understand the instructions, you will be able to earn a considerable 
amount of money which will be paid to you in cash. In the following instructions, you will be 
presented with some basic information followed by the market rules in this experiment. Raise you 
hand whenever you have question about the instructions. 
 
In this experiment, a series of market periods will be conducted. In each period, one hypothetical 
object will be sold. There are four participants in the market. 
 
In each period, each market participant receives an individual value and a group value signal for 
the object. These are your private information. Do not reveal them to other participants.   
 
Individual value is a number drawn between, and including, 475 and 525. Every whole number in 
this range is equally likely to be your individual value. 
 
Group value signal is a number drawn between, and including, 475 and 525. Every whole number 
in this range is equally likely to be your group value signal. 
 
Group value, which is the same for all participants, is the average of all participants‟ group value 
signals (This number will be rounded to 1 decimal place).   
 
Your true value of the object = group value + individual value.   
 
Example 1:   
Player ID  Group Value Signal  Individual Value  True Value 
1  476  523  523+497.5=1020.5 
2  489  486  486+497.5=983.5 
3  502  490  490+497.5=987.5 
4  523  510  510+497.5=1007.5 
The group value of the object will be (476+489+502+523)/4=497.5.   
 
 
Only one participant will be allocated with the object in each period. The participant who is 
allocated with the object will receive his true value  –  price paid.    If the price paid is higher 
than your true value, you will make a loss. Participants who are not allocated with the object in a 
period earn zero for that period. 
   44 
Example 1 Continues… 
If the price is 1000 and Player 1 is the winner, his profit is 1020.5-1000=20.5 (a profit of 20.5). 
If the price is 1000 and Player 2 is the winner, his profit is 983.5-1000=-16.5 (a loss of 16.5). 
If the price is 1000 and Player 3 is the winner, his profit is 987.5-1000=-12.5 (a loss of 12.5). 
If the price is 1000 and Player 4 is the winner, his profit is 1007.5-1000=7.5 (a profit of 7.5). 
 
 
The currency used in the experiment is called e-dollar. At the beginning of the experiment, each 
participant will be allocated with 50 e-dollars in their money balance. Any earning in the 
experiment will be added to (if it is positive) or subtracted from (if it is negative) the money 
balance.     
 
At the end of the experiment, e-dollar will be converted to US dollar at a rate of US$1= 2 e-dollars. 
In other words, if you have 20 e-dollars in your money balance, you earn US$10. 
 
We will keep checking your money balance throughout the experiment. If your money balance is 
less than or equal to zero, you will not be allowed to participate in the experiment. You are free to 
leave the lab and you will be paid with your show-up fee.   
 
Here is a summary of how you will be paid at the end of this experiment: 
     
If your money balance is greater than zero   
Total Earnings = Show up Fee+ Money balance in terms of US dollar 
 
If your money balance is less than or equal to zero     
Total Earnings = Show up Fee 
 





Each participant in a market period will be randomly allocated Player ID 1, 2, 3 or 4. After a 
period is started, your individual value, group value signal and the current price of the object will 
be displayed on the screen. 15 seconds after a period is started, the price will start to rise at the rate 
of 1 unit per half second. Through out the period, participants can choose to demand or not to 
demand the object through two radio buttons. In every second, the system will check the number 
of demand at the current price. If the number of demand is more than 1, the current price continues 
to go up. If the number of demand equals to 1, the period ends and the object will be allocated to   45 
the remaining bidder at the current price. If the number of demand equals to 0, the period ends and 
the system will randomly allocate the object to one of the participants who were demanding at the 
last price. Through out the period, participants will be informed the identity of participants 
demanding at each price. 
 
 
Note: Talking or any form of communication is not allowed in this experiment. If the 
experimenter finds any of these, the experiment will be stopped and all subjects will only be 
paid with their show up fee. 
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